From multinationals to business tycoons: media ownership and journalistic autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe by Vaclav Stetka (2797069)
 1 
 
From multinationals to business tycoons: media ownership and journalistic 
autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe 
Václav Štětka 
University of Oxford 
 
Abstract: 
This article presents a comparative analysis of the changing patterns of media ownership in ten new 
EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe, and discusses the implications of these processes 
for media freedom and autonomy. Briefly outlining the history of internationalization of CEE media 
markets, it argues that the presence of Western-based multinational companies on the CEE media 
markets has been recently diminishing rather than further growing. In addition, a different type of 
actor has been gaining prominence on the CEE media map, unspotted or largely overlooked in most 
previous analyses, namely local business elites acquiring stakes in news media. Combining secondary 
sources and field interviews with media experts and practitioners, this study explores the various 
practices of business and political instrumentalization of media by their local owners, often resulting 
in a constrained editorial independence and increasing intertwinement of the systems of media, 
politics and economy in the region. 
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Introduction
1
 
The so-called phone hacking scandal which erupted in the United Kingdom in July 2011, 
following the revelation of illegal work practices among journalists from the tabloid News of 
the World, has sparked vivid debates about journalistic ethics, respect for privacy and tabloid 
culture in general.
2
 However, apart from the public outrage over the unscrupulous behaviour 
of journalists hacking phone conversations of victims of criminal and terrorist acts, another 
thorny issue has been exposed in this controversy, namely the problem of concentrated media 
ownership and its impact on the democratic public sphere. The name of Rupert Murdoch, 
Chairman and CEO of the News Corporation, whose subsidiary News International had been 
publishing the News of the World until its closure on 10 July, was – yet again – brought into 
the spotlight, and his influence over British politics and public life in general became subject 
of unprecedented criticism, with journalists, intellectuals and politicians calling for an end to 
Murdoch’s empire in Britain, which, apart from the newspapers the Sun, the Times and the 
Sunday Times, includes a 39 per cent stake in the digital pay-TV platform BSkyB.
3
 The 
Labour Party leader Ed Miliband has publicly demanded that Murdoch’s empire “be 
dismantled” on the grounds that the media mogul is allegedly exercising “too much power 
over British public life”.4 Summing up the concerns about concentrated media power in the 
hands of one person who doesn’t hesitate to use it to advance his own political agenda and 
business interests, the Guardian commentator Will Hutton proposed it was high time to “start 
thinking harder about capitalism, ownership, the media and democracy”.5 
The topicality and applicability of this call certainly goes beyond the UK borders as 
well as beyond the particular case of Rupert Murdoch and the News Corporation. It can be 
argued that while in some Western European countries these issues have only recently started 
to spill out from the academic to the general public discourse, in other parts of Europe they 
have been part and parcel of everyday political battles and public debates for many years. 
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This is indeed true in most Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), where processes 
of democratic consolidation, the introduction of market capitalism and struggles for 
independent and pluralistic media environment went hand-in-hand after the fall of 
communism in 1989 (see Sparks 1998; Gross 2002; Jakubowicz 2006). Following the 
liberalization of media markets and privatization of previously state- or Communist Party-
owned outlets, most CEE media have been institutionally separated from government or 
political structures; nevertheless their former political dependence was often quickly replaced 
by dependence on market mechanisms, imposing new forms of control and constraints on 
their autonomy and democratic performance. With the market being notoriously interlocked 
with the state and political actors in many post-communist CEE countries, particularly in the 
early stages of transformation, news media have often found themselves under combined 
pressure from both political elites and economic forces, often leading to the establishment of 
a system of “paternalist commercialism” in the media (Splichal 2001: 51). While there have 
certainly been notable differences in velocity, extent and outcomes of media systems 
transformation among particular CEE countries (see Gross 2002 or Jakubowicz 2006 for a 
comprehensive analysis), from an overall perspective the news media in Central and Eastern 
Europe have only rarely managed to achieve full autonomy from constraining forces of other 
social subsystems, particularly politics and economy (Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008). In the 
language of neo-functionalist sociology, the process of “structural differentiation” of news 
media (Alexander 1981) has largely been inhibited, contrary to the hopes raised at the time of 
the regime change when the development of the CEE media systems was predominantly 
anticipated and pushed to imitate the Western liberal model, however idealised it might have 
been in the eyes of policymakers and media practitioners. Nevertheless, it had been generally 
expected that the above-quoted idiosyncrasies of the transformation phase would be 
overcome in the long run, and that the continuing processes of internationalization, 
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globalization and Europeanization, affecting the ownership structures, media policies as well 
as norms and standards of journalistic profession, would contribute to greater autonomy of 
media organisations and to further advancing of the process of differentiation, in line with 
some theoretical observations foreseeing global convergence of media systems – although not 
necessarily a straightforward one – towards the liberal model (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 294–
295). 
In this paper, some of these predictions and expectations are confronted with the 
empirical reality of CEE media markets at the beginning of the third decade of their post-
communist evolution. The comparative analysis, conducted as part of the broader research 
project Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,
6
 looks at the ten CEE countries 
which have joined the European Union since 2004 – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – and focuses at 
changing patterns of  media ownership in these markets, which have in the last several years 
been marked by gradual withdrawal of foreign media investors and an increasing 
involvement of local business elites in the news media sector. Following the description of 
the most important ownership changes in the recent past, the article further examines various 
practices of business and political instrumentalization of media by their local owners, and 
discusses their implications for media autonomy and consolidation of democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
In terms of research methodology, the article combines an analysis of secondary 
sources, mainly corporate websites, industry yearbooks and news articles, with information 
extracted from a set of 272 semi-structured elite and expert interviews, including interviews 
with media experts, activists and practitioners, conducted between 2010 and 2011 in all the 
ten countries in the sample. Following a criterion of “functional equivalence” (Hofstede 
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1998: 24), the selection of interviewees aimed to achieve a comparable mix of media outlets, 
institutions and types of informants in each country (see also Hanitzsch and Mellado 2011).
7
  
  
Internationalization of CEE media ownership – and its discontents 
Even though this analysis mainly concentrates on recent changes in CEE media ownership 
structures, it cannot be understood outside the historical context of the development of post-
communist media markets, which have been significantly shaped by inter- and transnational 
actors and forces in the course of the last twenty years. It can be indeed argued that until very 
recently the dominant narrative describing the transformation of CEE media markets has been 
the narrative of Westernization and globalization. Many reports and studies have mapped the 
presence of foreign investors and particularly transnational corporations, which have since 
1990 started entering and subsequently conquering developing media markets across the 
region (European Federation of Journalists 2003; Hrvatin and Petković 2004; Huber 2006). It 
is perhaps less stressed that the pace but also scope of ownership internationalization was not 
uniform, and unfolded depending on different privatization models, regulatory frameworks as 
well as the general course of political and economic transformation in particular countries. 
The influx of foreign investment into the Central and Eastern European media markets came 
fastest and with biggest intensity in countries which adopted the most liberal media 
legislation and which were, at the same time, perceived as more economically promising and 
politically stable (Gross 2002). On the other hand, in countries where privatization was either 
more carefully regulated, or hampered by political elites, foreign media companies usually 
started playing a more significant role only in the later stages of transformation, and often 
only in selected parts of the media landscape. Prime examples of the first type of countries 
are Hungary and the Czech Republic, where the majority of print media was transferred into 
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foreign hands within the first couple of years of transformation, following the process of 
“spontaneous privatization” of newspapers which, due to the absence of proper regulatory 
framework, were usually taken over by their own editorial teams at virtually no costs and 
then quickly sold to foreign investors (Downing 1996; Sparks 1998).  
Other countries have, however, opted for different privatization models, and imposed 
restrictions concerning the amount of foreign ownership. This was the case of Poland, where 
privatization of print press was regulated by a government-established commission which 
supervised the transfer of ownership of almost two hundred newspapers and periodicals, 
many of which were given to editorial teams (Klimkiewicz 2004: 373). Foreign ownership in 
broadcasting media was limited to 33 per cent of shares (raised to 49 per cent in 2004), which 
had arguably put the interests of potential foreign investors off, and their presence on the 
television market has until this day been rather limited. A similar cap on foreign ownership, 
but this time extended to any media enterprise, was effective between 1994–2001 in 
Slovenia, too. Apart from that restriction, the lower presence of foreign investment on the 
Slovenian press market has been attributed to the fact that most outlets turned out to be 
profitable, so there was no need to seek external investors, contrary to many other CEE 
countries (Hrvatin and Kučić 2004). 
In the case of the Baltic countries, which have all gone through a more or less similar 
process of spontaneous privatization of print media as their Central European counterparts 
(Balcytiene 2009), the coming of foreign investors in the news press markets was more 
delayed and, with the exception of Estonia, it did not result in their overwhelming dominance 
as in Hungary or the Czech Republic. The reasons for either the delayed or no entry have 
primarily been seen in the limited size and slow development of advertising markets, making 
the investment in an unknown territory too risky a business (Nagla and Kehre 2004). Finally, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and to an extent also Slovakia, experienced rapid privatization of the 
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press but relatively slow inflow of foreign investment, which can be attributed particularly to 
the tumultuous political and economic situation in the first years of transformation (Popova 
2004; Coman 2010; Fulmek 2000).  
In other words, the development of ownership internationalization of news media 
sectors in Central and Eastern Europe did not follow a universal pattern, and its outcomes 
displayed important differences across the regions. Rather than being swallowed by a sudden 
and all-encompassing invasion, local media outlets became part of the transnational media 
industries in a gradual, trial-and-error process which, apart from success stories, also saw 
many flops and changes of ownership within the first decade of transformation. Many of the 
initial “conquistadors”, including Western media tycoons like Robert Hersant, Silvio 
Berlusconi, Robert Maxwell or Leo Kirch, had withdrawn from some or all of the CEE 
markets by mid-1990, either because of unfavourable market results, or because of the “non-
standard entrepreneurial environment, absence of legal guarantees [or] corrupt business 
practices” (Splichal, 2001: 50), while others have either been smarter, luckier, or simply 
managed to better learn “the game of political capitalism”, as Colin Sparks has called the 
interweaving of market and politics in countries in transformation (Sparks1999: 42). In some 
countries, foreign ownership thus grew to dominate both print and broadcasting markets by 
the end of 1990s (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia), whereas in other 
ones foreign-owned companies managed to assume market leadership only partly – in print 
(Poland) or the broadcasting sector (Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia). 
The reactions to foreign investors’ arrival to the CEE news markets were certainly not 
unanimous either, and have displayed a mixture of hopes and concerns, with the latter ones 
arguably getting an edge of the former ones in the course of time. The established Western 
corporations were, first and foremost, expected to provide a much needed financial injection 
and to transport their technologies, know-how and managerial practices in order to elevate the 
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standards of the CEE news media production (Peruško and Popović 2008; Lauk 2008). As 
Slavko Splichal noted:  
“In many countries in East-Central Europe it was argued that without foreign investment into 
the media it would have been impossible to improve newsprint and printing quality, 
modernize editorial offices, and most importantly, to establish and equip radio and television 
stations.” (Splichal 2001: 46).  
While these “material” expectations have largely been fulfilled, the hopes related to the 
transporting of the Western professional journalistic culture have in many cases been met 
with disappointment. The unabashedly profit-seeking orientation of most international 
investors, manifested by the quickly spreading commercialization and tabloidization of their 
news media across the region, has visibly overshadowed the attempts to nurture quality 
journalism and safeguard journalistic independence, which has often been compromised in 
exchange for government protection and political favours (Sparks 1998; Gross 2002). As 
Balcytiene and Lauk have pointed out with respect to the Norwegian media conglomerate 
Schibsted, owner of the leading Estonian daily Postimees and many other titles,  
 “While Schibsted AS is regarded as a standard-setter of good journalistic practice and 
freedom of expression in Norway, the organisation does not show any interest in these issues 
in the Estonian media. Schibsted has not invested either effort or resources in introducing the 
excellent journalistic standards that they so strictly follow in their home country to its 
overseas media outlets” (Baltyciene and Lauk 2005: 101).” 
Adopting an even more critical tone, the European Federation of Journalists stated in its 2003 
report that “strong indications that aggressive commercial policies are being pursued [by the 
transnational corporations] at the expense of journalistic standards, threatening pluralism and 
undermining journalists’ professional and social rights” (European Federation of Journalists, 
2003: 4). In addition, many reports and analyses since the late 1990s have reported an 
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increasing concentration of media markets dominated by foreign investors. In the sector of 
local and regional press, this process has sometimes resulted in an effective duopoly, as in 
Poland or Hungary, or even monopoly, as in the Czech Republic or Slovakia (Dobek-
Ostrowska and Głowacki 2008). 
 
The changing tides: de-Westernization of CEE media markets? 
As some of the above-quoted concerns illustrate, the discussions about CEE media ownership 
have in the past been very much framed by the notion of an ever-increasing dominance of 
transnational corporations, and have ever more focused on the negative aspects of their 
impact on the local media cultures. Such perspective could not but create an impression that 
locally owned media would enable for higher quality journalism and consequently provide a 
better service to democracy, if only they got a chance to break through what the European 
Federation of Journalists once called “encroachments of Western media groups” (European 
Federation of Journalists 2005: 7).  
Recent developments across the CEE media markets however indicate a notable 
change of the empirical background against which the debates about Western versus local 
media ownership have taken place so far. While Western-based transnational companies had 
indeed held significant or even dominant stakes in news media across Central and Eastern 
Europe in the early 2000s, their undisputed position had begun to slowly erode towards the 
second half of the decade, as a number of investors decided either to sell their stakes in some 
of the media outlets, or to leave the region entirely. It is possible to detect the beginning of 
this wave of departure of foreign capital roughly around the year 2006, when the British-
based Mecom Group, shortly after it had acquired the Norwegian publisher Orkla, sold its 
media stakes in Lithuania (dailies Kauno Diena and Vilnius Diena) to local private equity 
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group Hermis Capital. Since then, every year has witnessed a withdrawal of at least one 
international media player from a CEE country in place of a local owner. In 2007, the 
German publisher Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt sold back the 50 per cent of shares it held in 
the Bulgarian publishing house Economedia to its Bulgarian co-owners and founders, Ivo 
Prokopiev and Philip Harmandjiev, and a year later it sold its acquisitions in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia – publishing house Economia, encompassing a number of financial 
papers and B2B magazines – to the Czech entrepreneur Zdeněk Bakala. Following the 
dramatic impact of the 2008 economic crisis on advertising markets in the Baltic countries, 
the Swedish-based Bonnier decided to fold up its business in Latvia in 2009 and sell one of 
the country’s largest publisher of daily press, Diena Group, to the Rowland family in 
England, which in turn sold 51 per cent of the shares to the Latvian businessman Viesturs 
Koziols. In the same year, the British-based Northcliffe International left Slovakia, having 
sold the national daily Pravda to local investors. The years 2009 and 2010 saw the departure 
of News Corporation from free-TV business in Poland (where it used to run small a cable 
station TV Puls), Latvia (the market leader LNT and a regional channel TV5 were sold to 
local media entrepreneur Andrejs Ekis), Bulgaria (the leading channel bNT was sold to CME) 
as well as Serbia. In 2010, Germany’s third largest publisher and one of the pioneers of the 
Eastern European print market invasion, the WAZ-Mediengruppe, decided to leave most of 
the Balkan region (with the exception of Macedonia). In Romania, Medien Holding, the 
publisher of the dailies Romania Libera and National, was purchased by Dan Adamescu; in 
Bulgaria the Newspaper Group Bulgaria went into the hands of two local businessmen, 
Ognyan Donev and Lyubomir Pavlov. Ringier followed suit in Romania the same year, 
having sold its shares in the Evenimentul zilei daily and Capital weekly to Bobby Paunescu; 
however, it still continues to publish the tabloid Libertatea, as well as a number of 
magazines. In summer 2011, Mecom sold its shares in Polish Presspublica (publisher of the 
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country’s fourth biggest daily Rzeczpospolita) to Polish businessman and film producer 
Grzegorz Hajdarowicz, and the Swedish publisher Metro International sold its Hungarian 
operations – the country’s most circulated paper Metropol – to Hungarian-owned company 
Megalopolis Media, which is going to continue publishing it as a franchise.  
In summary, the presence of transnational companies on CEE news media markets – 
although certainly still significant overall, particularly in the television sector – has grown 
visibly thinner in the last five or six years, as the empty circles in the Table 1 illustrate. 
Borrowing a term coined by James Curran and Myung-Jin Park over ten years ago (Curran – 
Park 2000), it makes it therefore possible to argue that the CEE markets have been currently 
undergoing a period of de-Westernization of media ownership, following a similar process 
which has been documented in the area of audiovisual flows in the region (see Štětka 2012).   
Tab. 1: Transnational media corporations in Central and Easter European news media markets 2006 – 
2011 (companies with at least 50% ownership shares) 
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Print media (national + regional) 
WAZ GER ○   ●    ○   
Verlagsgruppe Passau GER  ●     ●  ○  
Rheinische Post GER  ●     ●  ●  
Axel Springer 
a
 GER    ●   ●    
Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt GER ○ ○       ○  
Ringier 
a
 SWI  ●  ●    ● ●  
Metro International SWE  ○  ○       
Bonnier SWE ●   ●  ○ ● ●   ● 
Schibsted NOR   ●   ●     
Mecom 
b
  GBR       ○ ○    
Northcliffe International UK    ●     ○  
Styria Verlag  AUT           ● 
Television (national) 
MTG SWE ● ● ● ● ● ●    ● 
CME USA
 c
 ● ●      ● ● ● 
News Corp. USA ○    ○  ○    
RTL (Bertelsmann) GER    ●       
ProSiebenSat1/ SBS 
d
 GER     ●    ●   
Schibsted NOR   ●        
Legend: ● ownership by October 2011  ○ left between 2006-2011 
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a
 since 2010 operating as Ringier Axel Springer Media in several CEE countries 
b 
until 2006 Orkla Media (Norway) 
c
 officially the company is registered in Bermudas; however its founder and main shareholder is Ronald Lauder, 
U.S. entrepreneur. 
d 
ProSiebenSat.1 acquired SBS Broadcasting in 2007; the company is majority owned by private equity firms 
KKR and Permira 
 
Sources: corporate websites; own research 
 
 
There were manifold reasons for the above summarised withdrawals of some of the foreign 
corporations from the CEE markets. Arguably one of the most important ones has been the 
economic crisis which hit the media in the CEE region in the last couple of years and caused 
the sharp fall of advertising revenues in many countries, particularly in print media, which 
had already been coping with a long-term decline of circulation; this was for example the 
ultimate reason why Bonnier left Latvia in 2009.
8
 Internal factors like re-structuralizing of the 
core company or shifting of the business strategy could have played an important role, too – 
examples being the departure of Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt from Central and Eastern 
Europe, which was reportedly caused by a split among its owners, members of the von 
Holtzbrinck family,
 9
 or the decision of News Corporation to abandon its free-TV operations 
in the region and concentrate on pay-TV business instead.
10
 However, in some cases it was 
not just the recession or sole market development to have been blamed for the unsatisfactory 
economic results of the foreign-owned media in the CEE region, but allegedly also the 
increasing inability to compete in an environment ruled by other-than-market rules. In a 
newspaper interview published in August 2010, the CEO of the WAZ Media Group Bodo 
Hombach explained that the reason for the pull-out from Romania and Serbia (soon followed 
by Bulgaria in late 2010) was the “unfavorable business climate” caused by “widespread 
abuse of power” in the region. According to Hombach, “the close intertwining of oligarchs 
and political power is poisoning the market,” leading to the diminishing of free market 
competition in the South European media sector.
 
As Hombach put it,  
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“Oligarchs in the Balkans are buying ever more often newspapers and magazines in order to 
exert political influence, not in order to win money. We cannot stand up to such market-
destroying competition”.11 
Regardless of whether this was the true reason behind WAZ’s pull-out from the three Balkan 
countries, or an attempt to find a scapegoat for the poor economic performance of its titles, 
the CEO pointed to a phenomenon which has been repeatedly confirmed by practitioners as 
well as academics, and whose importance goes well beyond the borders of the Balkan region, 
characterising many of the Central and Eastern European media systems of today. That 
phenomenon concerns growing number of investments by local business elites into news 
media outlets, which are then often used as instruments to promote business or political 
interests of these entrepreneurs. In other words, parallel to the diminishing of foreign capital 
in favour of domestic media investments, there is a rising prominence of local owners with 
other-than-media background, whose main areas of business activities – and thereby primary 
sources of profit – lie outside the media sector. 
 
 
Business elites into media moguls: business as (un)usual? 
This type of media ownership has certainly not been unknown in Europe, particularly in the 
southern part of the continent. Adopting the term “non-media diversifiers”, defined as “non-
media financial interests and businesses from, at first sight, unrelated sectors”, Peter 
Humphreys argued that they “were to be found most thickly on the ground in countries where 
established media interests were weaker and where they were therefore presented with a 
relatively open field” (Humphreys 1995: 209); that is, in countries like France and 
particularly Italy, rather than in Germany or the UK. Describing the type of ownership 
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commonly found in Greece or Italy, Jeremy Tunstall and Michael Palmer (1991) spoke of 
“media/industrialist moguls”, understood as “entrepreneurs who are primarily captains in 
some other industrial field, but in addition own and operate major media interests” (Tunstall 
and Palmer 1991: 105-106). These entrepreneurs were juxtaposed by Tunstall and Palmer 
against the “pure” or “classic” type of media moguls (well known in the history of Western 
journalism as “press barons”) who confine their business activities largely to the media 
sector. Other authors have used terms like “tycoons” (Mazzoleni 1991) or simply 
“industrialists” (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002; Hallin and Mancini 2004, Leandros 
2010), referring very much to the same type of actors – rich and powerful individuals running 
their own media empires as a side-business and often exercising considerable influence on 
the domestic political scene. 
Looking at the current situation in the new EU members states from Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is possible to spot the presence of at least one such figure in almost every 
country, with the exception of Slovenia (where local media ownership tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of state-controlled funds and companies) and Estonia.  The Table 2 
provides an overview of the most prominent industrial and financial tycoons, assessed either 
by their position among local business elites or by the significance of their media 
investments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
Tab. 2: Main CEE business tycoons involved in news media sector (2011) 
Country Name Main company 
(majority 
owner / CEO) 
Main area(s) of business Media ownership (main media 
outlets) 
Bulgaria  Sasho 
Donchev 
Overgas  gas distribution Sega (national daily) 
Czech 
Republic  
Zdeněk 
Bakala  
New World 
Resources 
coal mining, coking plants, 
energy production and  
distribution 
Hospodářské noviny (business daily) 
Ekonom (business weekly) 
Respekt (political weekly) 
Several B2B magazines 
 Petr Kellner  PPF Group private equities, 
real estate, insurance, banking 
Euro (business weekly)
a
 
 Tomáš 
Chrenek 
Moravia Steel 
Agel 
steel production; health care TV Barrandov (national digital TV 
channel) 
Hungary  Gábor Széles  Videoton 
Ikarus 
TV sets + electronics 
production 
bus production 
Magyar Hírlap (national daily) 
Echo TV (business channel) 
 
Latvia  Aivars 
Lembergs 
Ventspils 
Group 
oil production + distribution Neatkariga Rita Avize (national 
daily)* 
 Viesturs 
Koziols  
Tritan real estate development ; city 
planning 
Diena (national daily) 
Lithuania  Bronislovas 
Lubys  
(†2011) b 
Achema Group chemical industry, hotel 
management, financial 
operations 
Lieuvos zinios (national daily) 
Baltijos TV 
RC2 (radio station) 
 Darius 
Mockus  
MG Baltic investments; 
beverage industry, retail of 
clothing, real estate 
LNK (national TV) 
Alfa.lt 
UPG Baltic (publishing) 
Poland  Zygmunt 
Solorz-Żak  
PTE Polsat 
Polisa 
Invest Bank 
Elektrim 
Polkomtel 
pension funds; insurance; 
banking; energy; telecommuni-
cations 
TV Polsat (national free TV + 12 
other channels) 
Cyfrowy Polsat (pay TV) 
Romania  Dan 
Voiculescu  
GRIVCO 
group 
trade, media, energy, industry 
and services 
Antena (national TV) 
Jurnalul Naţional (national daily) 
Gazeta sporturilol (national daily) 
 Dinu Patriciu Rompetrol 
Group (until 
2007) 
petrochemical industry, 
refineries; real estate, banking 
Adevǎrul (national daily) 
Click! (national daily) 
 Sorin Vântu  
 
Realitatea-
Caţavencu 
Trust 
real estates, media, insurance, 
banking 
Realitatea (national TV) 
several niche television channels 
and FM radio stations 
Slovakia  Patrik Tkáč 
& Ivan 
Jakabovič 
J&T Group banking,  real estate, corporate 
investments, services 
TV JOJ (national TV) 
JOJ Plus (cable TV) 
Pravda (national daily)
 c
 
a 
sold in November 2011 to Czech businessman Milan Procházka 
b the majority stake in the Achema Group continues to be held by Lubys’s wife Lyda Lubiene 
c 
ownership not officially admitted 
 
Sources: own research; corporate websites 
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A common denominator of most of these figures is that they belong to the wealthiest people 
in their respective countries or even in the whole CEE region. The Czech financial tycoon 
Petr Kellner  currently tops the ranking of CEE billionaires, with an estimated wealth of $9.2 
billion, earning him a 97
th
 place on the Forbes list of world’s richest people in 2011.12 
Zygmunt Solorz-Żak, the Polish entrepreneur who is the only man in the table not to have 
expanded to media from other sectors of industry, but building his business empire from his 
successful TV operations, was ranked 488
th
 ($2.4 billion). The former CEO of Rompetrol 
Group and publisher of Romania’s most circulated newspaper, Dinu Patriciu, was placed 
540
th
 ($2.2 billion),
13
 while another Czech, the “coal baron” Zdeněk Bakala, occupied the 
595
th
 spot ($2 billion).
14
 But even outside of the Forbes list, other tycoons are not exactly 
poor relatives: Bronislovas Lubys, chairman of the Achema Group, was reportedly the richest 
man in Lithuania;
15
 and Gábor Széles, Aivars Lembergs, Dan Voiculescu and Sorin Ovidiu 
Vântu as well as Patrik Tkáč and Ivan Jakabovič are all estimated to be among the Top 5-10 
richest people in their countries. 
The type and extent of their media operations differ considerably – some of them, like 
Bakala, Patriciu, Solorz-Żak or the Latvian businessmen Aivars Lembergs and Viestrus 
Koziols, keep their portfolio within one media sector, while others are expanding diagonally, 
combining ownership of broadcasting media with publishing activities. In several cases, the 
ownership relations are not transparent to the public, and some of these tycoons officially 
deny having any stakes in particular outlets, but independent observers and the journalistic 
community have repeatedly pointed to their existence; this concerns particularly Lemberg’s 
relationship to the publishing house Mediju Nams and its flagship Neatkariga Rita Avize 
(Örnebring 2011), or the proprietary links of the J&T company, belonging to the two Slovak 
tycoons Jakabovič and Tkáč, to the daily Pravda.16 Unsurprisingly, this problem extends well 
beyond the above quoted list of owners, as the lack of media ownership transparency counts 
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as one of the most notorious features of CEE media systems (Hrvatin and Petković 2004). A 
particularly palpable example of this problem represents the ownership of the New Bulgarian 
Media Group, the largest media house in Bulgaria, which is officially in the hands of Irena 
Krasteva, however the real owner is believed to be Tsvetan Vasilev, majority owner of the 
Corporate Commercial Bank, which has financed the establishment of the New Bulgarian 
Media Group and its subsequent purchase and operation of all the media outlets.
17
 
From the research perspective of this study, even more important is the involvement 
of these tycoons in political life and their formal or informal links to politicians and political 
parties. As a number of researchers have pointed out in relation to the South European 
industrialists, these kinds of actors often nurture political alignments, or even aspire to their 
own political career. Tunstall and Palmer speak in particular of a “distinctive Italian school of 
political moguls” (Tunstall and Palmer 1991: 113), with the figure of Silvio Berlusconi as an 
ultimate example of the latter version of a media mogul-turned-politician. While there is 
arguably nobody comparable to the Italian Prime Minister in contemporary Central and 
Eastern Europe – the person who earned himself a label of “Slovak Berlusconi”, the former 
Minister of Culture (2003–2004) and ex-CEO of TV Markíza Pavol Rusko, is long history – 
most of the above listed business elites can be safely ascribed distinct political affiliations, 
which manifest themselves either by being active members of political parties and running 
for public office, and/or through political sponsorship. Of the names listed in the Table 2, 
representatives of the former category include Aivars Lembergs, Mayor of Latvia’s second 
biggest city of Ventspils and the 2006 Prime Minister candidate for The Union of Greens and 
Farmers party, which he continues to support; Dan Voiculescu, Chairman of the Romanian 
Humanist Party (now Conservative Party) and senator since 2004; or Dan Costache Patriciu, 
member of the National Liberal Party of Romania and an MP until 2003. 
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Other tycoons engage in political sponsorship instead of chasing public offices. 
Before the 2010 Czech Parliamentary elections, Zdeněk Bakala for example openly divided 
28.5 million CZK (about 1.7 mil. $) among three political parties which subsequently formed 
a centre-right coalition government. On the day of the elections, Bakala himself wrote a 
commentary in his flagship daily Hospodářské noviny, endorsing the political Right, and 
thereby the parties he supported financially. Gábor Széles, since 2005 the owner of the 
influential daily Magyar Hírlap, which he turned from an originally liberal to a right-wing 
daily, has been sponsor of the right-wing party Fidesz, which in 2010 achieved constitutional 
majority in the Hungarian Parliament.
18
 In other cases, however, political linkages of tycoons 
are not openly displayed but yet remain a “public secret”; this might be the case of the men 
behind the Slovak investment group J&T, Patrik Tkáč and Ivan Jakabovič, who have been 
closely associated with the former governing party SMER and its leader and ex-prime 
minister Robert Fico,
19
 or the Latvian tycoon Viestrus Koziols, who was publicly perceived 
as a supporter of the party Par Labu Latviju (“For a Good Latvia”) – the so-called “oligarch 
party” – in the 2010 elections.20 
 
Editorial interferences and types of instrumentalization: journalism at risk? 
The crucial questions surrounding this type of media ownership of course concern the 
motivation of the business elites for investing in the media, and the way they manage their 
outlets, particularly with respect to editorial autonomy. These questions seem to be most 
relevant in cases of print media which are very often money-losing business, especially in 
times of economic recession and the decline of advertising market which the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe witnessed between 2008-2009. As it has been argued by other 
observers (Gross 2008; Coman 2010), because of their core business interests lying 
 19 
 
elsewhere, the tycoons don’t necessarily need to follow the classical business model and keep 
their media profitable as they are able to subsidise them from sources generated by other-
than-media companies in their portfolio. Therefore, rather than seeking profit, they are often 
seen as using their media in order to exercise public influence and to advance their business 
and political goals.  
Again, it is possible to trace parallels to Southern European media systems here. 
According to Mazzoleni (1991), the Italian moguls have always considered particularly daily 
press “a strategic investment” and a way of getting closer to the political parties. The tradition 
of industrial tycoons using their media as political weapons, embodied in the popular phrase 
“give me a ministry or I will start a newspaper”, has allegedly been long established in 
Greece, too (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002: 178). Hallin and Mancini use the term 
“instrumentalization” to describe “the control of the media by outside actors–parties, 
politicians, social groups, or economic actors seeking political influence, who use them to 
intervene in the world of politics” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 37) and treat it as one of the 
significant features of the whole Mediterranean (or, as the authors name it, “polarized-
pluralist”) model of the relations between media and political systems, as opposed to the two 
other models they identified in their seminal book —the North American (“liberal”) and the 
North/Central European (“democratic-corporatist”) model – which are, among others, 
characterized by a relatively higher level of journalistic autonomy.  
The evidence from Central and Eastern Europe suggests that there are various types of 
instrumentalization of news media by local business elites, stretching from “pure” business 
PR to direct and open attacks on political or business opponents. At the same time, each of 
these types entails a different level of editorial interference by the proprietors. The first type 
of instrumentalization, namely the publishing of information which promotes the owner’s 
other business, might well be the most frequent one, although hard proof of these practices is 
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difficult to find. However, the interviews conducted as part of the MDCEE research project 
indicate that the journalistic community is quite certain of its existence. According to one 
Czech journalist’s opinion,  
“It is clear that commercial TV is built on the principle to make money, and if it has a 
particular owner, they have their interests they follow /.../ You need to have a product which 
appears to be the most credible one, and only through this product you can – once in a while – 
leak information which is useful for your business. It is clear that the one who owns such a 
medium will use this opportunity once in a while.”   
(editor of a commercial TV, the Czech Republic) 
Another type of instrumentalization concerns the use of media to cover-up corruption 
scandals involving the owners and to divert attention from (or to defend against) criminal 
charges or any other type of negative publicity. This appears to be the case of the Latvian 
oligarch Aivars Lembergs, whose Ventspils Group bought the publishing house Mediju Nams 
(and with it the second-largest paper Neatkarige Rita Avize) in 1998 allegedly to have his 
own publicity channel after the journalists from Diena had started digging into his dubious 
business activities and uncovering his corruption cases.
21
 Similar strategies have been 
ascribed to some of the Romanian moguls, particularly to Dan Voiculescu, a former agent of 
the communist secret police Securitate, who had been charged with money laundering and 
other corruption practices in the past; or Sorin Ovidiu Vântu, according to some observers 
“one of the most controversial businessmen in Romania” (Coman 2010: 588), who has also 
had a history of criminal prosecution.  
Promoting and protecting political or business allies, and, conversely, suppressing 
opponents or competitors, has been yet another strategy employed by some of the CEE media 
owners, thereby putting pressure on editorial autonomy. In Slovakia, shortly before the 2010 
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general elections, a reporter of the J&T-owned TV JOJ was suspended for preparing a critical 
report revealing controversial financing of the ruling party SMER. The report was not aired, 
allegedly on a direct order from one of the two J&T owners, Ivan Jakabovič.22 Journalists at 
the third most watched Slovak private television station, the news channel TA3, belonging to 
the advertising mogul Ivan Kmotrík, have been systematically instructed by their 
management on which particular people and companies to promote/suppress in the news, 
depending on their personal or political allignments or whether they were advertising on the 
channel.
23
 The Czech billionaire Peter Kellner has been reported to have interferred with the 
editorial policy of his business weekly Euro on several occasions, ultimately leading to 
departure of the editor-in-chief Petr Léko, together with over a half of the staff, after Kellner 
had demanded that PR material promoting a politician from the ruling party ODS be 
published (Hvížďala 2011: 215). 
Arguably the crudest cases of political instrumentalization are observed in the Balkan 
countries, where media are frequently and openly used by their owners as weapons in 
political combat (Gross 2008; Coman 2010). Two of Romania’s three main television 
channels, Antena TV and Realitatea TV, belonging to Voiculescu and Vântu, respectively, 
have repeatedly and fiercely attacked the incumbent president Traian Băsescu, particularly 
during the 2009 elections, which many saw as part of the ongoing political battle between the 
president and the above mentioned moguls.
24
 Legitimising these practices, Dan Voiculescu 
reportedly claimed that the “theory of independent media is a chimera” (Gross 2008: 128). 
However, as Peter Gross has argued, Voiculescu has only voiced an opinion shared by all 
other moguls who “wield their media outlets like broadswords in the interest of politics and 
profit” (Gross 2008: 128). In Bulgaria, according to local observers, the son of Irena Krasteva 
and MP for the Turkish-ethnic party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), Delyan 
Peevski, is believed to be “practically running all of these media [belonging to Krasteva’s 
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New Bulgarian Media Group] by deciding on front page articles and editorial policy”, and the 
company’s media outlets are “generally known for not voicing any criticism of the DPS party 
or of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [both in opposition at the moment] by adopting a ‘no 
mention’ policy”.25 However, the currently ruling GERB party and the Prime Minister Boyko 
Borisov have reportedly also been receiving above-standard treatment by Krasteva’s media – 
a notable U-turn from the editorial line preceding the 2009 elections which focused on 
attacking GERB and Borisov himself, often on a very personal level.
26
 
 
Concluding remarks: consequences for media and democracy 
Undoubtedly, there are important differences among the various business tycoons in Central 
and Eastern Europe, both in terms of the extent of their involvement in either the media 
business or political games, as well as in terms of their business and civic reputation. Having 
no record of criminal trials or charges of corruption, and reported to keep a rather hands-off 
approach to their news media outlets, tycoons like Lubys, Bakala or Solorz-Żak clearly 
constitute a notably different breed of entrepreneurs than, for example, Lembergs or Patriciu. 
Nevertheless, even if the owners did not intend to instrumentalize their media for whatever 
purpose, and did not interfere with their media’s editorial policies, the sheer fact of ownership 
by a powerful figure with multiple non-media interests might act as a deterrent of 
investigative reporting about issues perceived as related to the owner’s business or political 
activities. This well-known practice of self-censorship, or the “scissors-in-the-heads” effect, 
as some have called it,
27
 has led to a suppression of critical writing in some countries, as the 
Bulgarian journalist Alexej Lazarov pointed out:  
 “Most of the time, the interests of the owners are not specifically conveyed to the journalists; there is 
no formal policy in these papers saying we cannot attack these and those people, and so on. So you are 
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in a position that you don’t know exactly who the good and bad guys are, and you start to do something 
very vague – not to criticise anybody, because you could be wrong...” 28 
Apart from these very practical, and potentially troublesome, consequences for independence 
and democratic roles of journalism in possession of local business elites, the concentration of 
business, media and political power in the hands of “significant individuals” (Hrvatin and 
Petković 2004: 20) has implications for the theory of media systems in post-communist 
Europe. Essentially, the above outlined development contradicts the predicted tendency 
towards systemic differentiation, and confirms that the process of media autonomisation is 
still “far from complete”, as Karol Jakubowicz had already observed ten years ago 
(Jakubowicz 2001: 73). Comparing the situation in Central and Eastern European countries 
with other European media systems, the intertwinement of media, political and business 
organisations is arguably most similar to the systems of South European countries, 
particularly Italy and Greece. This observation is in line with the previously formulated 
hypotheses about “Italianisation” (Splichal 1994; Wyka 2008) or “Mediterreanisation” 
(Jakubowicz 2008) of the CEE media, although these have so far not been explicitly drawn to 
ownership structures. At the same time, while the comparative media research related to the 
CEE region has predominantly been looking to the West, it might be equally plausible – 
albeit perhaps much less comforting – to point to similarities with some of the more Eastern, 
particularly post-Soviet countries, where the concentration of media, business and political 
power in the hands of significant individuals – colloquially known as oligarchs – has been 
omnipresent ever since the fall of communism (Nemtsov 1999; De Smaele 2010), and the 
practices of instrumentalization of newly privatized media by various “patrons” have been an 
integral part of the local political and media cultures (Roudakova 2008). In this respect, it 
should be considered that the path of “oligarchization” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2008: 91) might 
potentially be followed in various countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and not just in 
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those of the former Soviet Union. While Romania and Bulgaria, commonly described as 
laggards of the post-communist transformation process among the new EU member states, 
have been ascribed these tendencies by many authors and reports, it has been less common to 
suggest that processes of a similar nature – albeit arguably not of a similar extent – can also 
be observed in countries usually scoring higher in indicators of democracy and media 
freedom, like the Czech Republic, Lithuania or Slovakia.
29
 Given the wave of 
“posttransitional and postaccession backlash” (Rupnik 2007), which has recently or in the 
near past brought various populist or right-wing extremist political forces to power in several 
Central European countries, the diminishing autonomy of their news media, which has indeed 
been confirmed by the worsening of the scores of most CEE countries on the Press Freedom 
Index in the last several years, might come as less of a surprise. 
The commonalities across the CEE countries regarding the intertwinement of their media, 
business and political structures should, of course, not obscure significant deviations from the 
above detected patterns. This concerns particularly the two smallest CEE media markets, 
Estonia and Slovenia, where the phenomenon of business tycoons investing in news media is 
virtually unknown (as are the figures of oligarchs themselves), as well as the biggest one – 
Poland, where the diversified business-media portfolio controlled by Zygmunt Solorz-Żak 
represents an exception rather than a norm. Conversely, in these countries there are several 
examples of strong domestic-owned media enterprises operating without structural 
dependence on other business domains. The Polish media house Agora, co-founded by the 
former dissident Adam Michnik and owning, among other outlets, the country’s leading 
quality paper Gazeta Wyborcza, the free daily Metro, as well as a group of local radio station 
Radio TOK FM, certainly belongs to the most successful news media companies in the whole 
CEE region. The ITI Group, established in the mid-1990s by the businessman Jan Wejchert and 
a respected journalist Mariusz Walter, has evolved in a multi-media conglomerate, encompassing 
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over a dozen television channels (including a news channel TVN-24), multiplex cinema network, 
a film production company and a range of internet portals. The Ekspress Grupp, whose co-
founder and main shareholder is the editor of Eesti Express and local “media mogul” Hans Luik, 
accounts for the leading Estonian publisher (alongside with the Schibsted-owned Eesti Media), 
with its internet news portal Delfi thriving and expanding to other countries in the region. Having 
built their reputation for political independence and support of quality journalism, these 
companies document that news media can retain autonomy even under local ownership, and that 
the “traditional”, profit-oriented business model of journalism does not necessarily have to be in 
conflict with the fulfilment of media’s democratic roles, as it is sometimes suggested by critical 
media scholarship (e.g. Keane, 1991). On the contrary, under the conditions of sustained 
pressures and attempts for media capture by political or business actors, endemic to the CEE 
region, profitability is widely seen by the interviewed journalists and media managers as the best 
protection against undue influences on the news making process.  
However, in most CEE media markets the category of independent domestic players, particularly 
those with a strong professional journalistic legacy embodied by their founders and proprietors 
(as is the case in all the three above mentioned examples), is either missing, or it is largely limited 
to niche and alternative outlets. In the context of the ever-shrinking economic base for news 
production, currently challenging the business model of journalism not just in the CEE region but 
elsewhere around the Western world, as well as of the diminishing presence of international 
actors, mainstream media organizations are increasingly facing the risk of getting woven into the 
local political-economic networks and power structures. While they can indeed provide a 
temporary sanctuary for part of the journalistic community and perhaps even save some news 
outlets from extinction, the price to be paid for this arrangement might well be too high – both for 
the media, who are putting their autonomy at stake and getting instrumentalized for hidden 
business/political interests, as well as for democracy, which is widely believed to rely upon 
independent and genuinely pluralistic media to enable circulation of unbiased information, to 
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facilitate dialogue among varied societal groups or to hold those in power accountable (see 
Schudson, 2008). In a situation where a growing part of the CEE media landscapes is 
controlled by actors whose own activities and interests should arguably be the subject of 
media scrutiny, there is a reason to dispute the ability of the media to safeguard the above 
quoted functions. More research is certainly needed to unveil the conditions which facilitate 
the rise of oligarchic structures in supposedly consolidated democracies, as well as their 
actual power to shape public opinion. Such a task lies beyond the scope of the present paper; 
however, the assembled evidence makes it possible to argue that after having been concerned 
primarily with the impact of transnational corporations for the most part of the two decades 
of transformation, research on media and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe could 
benefit from a change of focus.  
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2
 Although there has been a long history of allegations of phone hacking by Rupert Murdoch’s newspapers, the 
scandal fully broke out on 4 July 2011 following the revelation by the Guardian that the News of the World had 
hacked into voicemails of Milly Dowler, the British schoolgirl who was murdered in 2002. 
  
3
 In 2010 the News Corporation announced its intention to bid for a full takeover of BSkyB; however the 
proposal was withdrawn in July 2011 following the phone hacking scandal. 
 
4
 According to http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jul/16/rupert-murdoch-ed-miliband-phone-hacking, last 
accessed 30 October 2011.  
 
5
 According to http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/12/bskyb-bid-rupert-
murdoch?INTCMP=SRCH, last accessed 30 October 2011.  
 
6
 http://mde.politics.ox.ac.uk  
 
7
 The sampling of interviewees has reflected specific research objectives of the Media and Democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe project, which apart from the questions of media ownership and autonomy examines 
issues of media regulation, journalistic culture as well as selected key institutions and actors of democracy. The 
sub-sample of media actors and organisations was divided into three main quota categories (editors; 
managers/owners; experts) and up to date it has involved 29 senior journalists – deputy editors or editors-in-
chief of main news outlets (2-3 per country, from both print and electronic media), 14 managers or CEOs of 
major media companies and 12 local media experts (academics or independent observers). Only names of those 
interviewees which particular information or quotes were attributed to are displayed in this article. 
 
8
 As a direct consequence of the economic crisis, media advertising expenditures plummeted all across the 
region in 2009, most in Latvia (-44%), followed by Estonia (-35%) and Romania (-32%); only in Slovenia the 
advertisers spent 10% money than in previous year (WAN Yearbook, 2010). 
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9
 Interview with Michal Klíma, former CEO of the publishing house Economia, Czech Republic (Prague, 3 June 
2010). 
 
10
 Interview with Lyuba Rizova, editor-in-chief of bTV news department, Bulgaria (Sofia, 14 September 2011).  
 
11
 According to http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/konzernchef-hombach-sagt-dem-balkan-
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